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Recent proposals to reform the U.S. tax code all contain signifi-
cant reforms of the cufrent provision allowing for the deductibility of
state and local taxes.
This paper examines the effect of deductibility reform on the reve-
nue decisions of the largest U.S. cities. The analysis of eight alternative
reforms concludes:(1) total taxes change very little in the long—run,
falling at most by 13% and, for many cities, even rising slightly; (2) fees
and license revenue (predominantly a tax on firms) generally fall, in some
cases by 30% or more; (3) the net effect on total revenues (tax plus fees)
is generally small, never declininq by more than 12% even with full loss of
deductibility; and (4) policies to offset city revenue losses are effective
in neutralizing the negative effects of deductibility reform.
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For the first time since the adoption of the income tax in1913.
the federal government is considering a major, fundamental overhaulof
the United States tax code. Members of Congress from bothparties and
the Reagan Administration have offered reform proposals whichgreatly
simplify the present tax system, while also advancing, it can be
argued, the dual objectives of economic efficiency and tax equity.
All reform proposals contain changes in the federal tax law whichmay
hive important implications for the financing of state and local
governments. Foremost among these changes is the removal, fully or in
part, of the current deductibility of state and local taxes from
household income when calculating federal tax payments. There is
tentative evidence (Zimmerman. 1983; Noto and Zimmerman, 1984) to
suggest the present deductibility of state—local taxes may stimulate
the provision of state—local government services by providinga
subsidy to state—local taxation. There is more conclusive evidence
(Rock, 1984) to show that the deductibility of state—local taxes
reduces the progressivity of our overall (federal—state—local) tax
system. If we were to remove the federal deductibility of state—local
taxes we might then observe a smaller, and possibly more efficient.
state—local public sector as well as a more progressive combined tax
system.
The purpose of this research is to examine as carefully as
1current evidence allows the effects on local finance of federal and
state deductibility of local taxation. The analysis first estimates
the impact of past changes in federal and statedeductibility on the
decisions of our largest cities to useproperty, sales, and income
taxes aswellasuserfees and licenses for the financing of public
1
services.Thesamplefor this econometric analysis is the forty—one
largest U.S. cities (excluding Washington, D.C. and Honolulu because
of their uniquefinancialrelationship to federal and state
governments, respectively) for the twenty—one fiscal years, 1960—1980.
A data base of this breadth anddepthis needed if wehopeto
accurately reveal the influence of such a sporadic policy change as
2 fedsral and state taxdeductibility.Given econometric estimates of
city responses to changes in federal and stats deductibility, the
analysis then predicts the effects on the level and structure of local
financeof a variety of alternative federal reforms for the deduction
of state and localtaxes. Reforms considered include the
Administration'sinitial proposal for full removal of deductibility,
proposals (such as the Kemp—tasten and Bradley—Gephardt tax reform
bills) for selective removal, and finally, a series ofcompromise
proposals which remove deductibility but offer increased revenue—
sharing aid or percentage tax credits for local taxes in hopes of
softening the blov to after—tax incomes or public services received
by local taxpayers.
II. Deductibility and the Local Decision to Tax
Citiesbudget subject to constraints. Legal constraints
influence local finance by defining the fiscal choices availableto
cities. Economicconstraintsset the limitsto how many dollarscan
2be allocated along each dimension of choice. Politicalconstraints
detail the process by which dollars are so allocated.Together the
three constraints set the local budget. I will focus hereon only one
aspects of the local public budget —therevenue decision —andthe
effects of tightening one of the constraints —theeconomic
constraint —throughthe removal of deductibility for local taxes.
For this analysis I will assume that the level and structure of
loc•l revenues are set by a majority ruleprocess involving two or
note coalitions of voters.Since the budgetary process will
generally require decisions on several policy dimensions the usual
media voter model will not apply.3Rather, city budgets will emerge
from a bargaining process among the relevant voter coalitions.
Ideally, we would like to specify and estimate a structural model of
this bargaining process, unraveling coalition preferences and the
political weights in the process. That task is beyond us here.4 We
can, however, specify a reduced—form model of local budgeting which,
subject to the usual caveats regarding structure stability, will allow
us to estimate the effects on local finance of changes in
deductibility. Is section III, I will outline one possible structural
model of local finance which helps to rationalize the observed
reduced—form estimates.
A generalized. reduced—form specification ofrevenue allocations
by city i in year s can be specified as:
(T) (T) (T) (l)T. a.+$ I + is is is is is
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Equations (1) to (3) are behavioral equations in which totaltaxes
Cr) (T), individual taxes(t •r1 ...) and fees and licenses (F) are
seen to depend upon the vector of legal, economic, and political
constraints 11is' Equation (4) is s budget identity whichdefines
total non—debt revenue (K) as the sum of taxes and fees.5
Included in the vector as legal constraints are local city
spending obligations for education (DED =1if the city has primary
responsibility for education. 0 otherwise), and welfare (ML 1, if
the city has primary responsibility for AFDCwelfare, 0 otherwise) and
state prohibitions on the use of local taxes other thanproperty
taxation (DI =1if city can use the income tax. 0 otherwise; DSS 1
if city can use selective sales taxes, 0otherwise; and DGS —1if
city can use a general sales tax, 0 otherwise).6 In addition,states
often place restrictions on the rate of localproperty taxation;
either as a limit to the nominal, or •ill (taxpir *1000 of assessed
value), rate or (more recently) as a limit to the effective (or•srket
value) rate. The more coon state—imposed limit to nominalrates is
specified as the inverse of the state mill rate limit (RLIM) while the
state limit to the effective property tax rate is specifiedas a
4simple 1 (if an effective rate limit applies)or 0 (if no effective
rite limit applies) dummy variable (LEVYLIM).7
Theeconomic constraints included in are per capita city
income after state and federal taxes butbefore local taxation (CINC),
federal and state aid from categorical (butnot open—ended matching)
aid programs (CAID), federal aid fromgeneral revenue—sharing
(RSAID),anda city cost—of—living index (Pt).8Also included in the
vector Us an economic constraint will be theability of a city to
export a portion of its local tax burden eitherby taxing non—
residents or by using federal and state tax codeprovisions which
allow the deduction of, or creditsfor, local taxation. Localtax
exportation through non—resident taxation ordeductibility will in
effect lower the 5rice to residents ofraising local revenues; the
direct burden of local taxes is reduced by the shareof the burden
exported.
To make this notion of tax exportationprecise, andtoallow us
to test for the effects of deductibilityon local finance, I have
specified a variable called the burden price of taxation.9A dollar
raised from local tax twillreduce resident incomes not by *1, but
rather by (r) dollars (cr)j1), where is called the burden
price of tax r and is defined by:
(r). (f) (f) (f) (a) (s) (a) (r) (r) tt(1_pq—6 pq—y )(1—O ),
where =1if the local tax is claimed as a federaldeduction, 0
otherwise; 5( 1 if the local tax is claimed asa state deduction,
ootherwise; and p(s) equal the portion of the local tax which
Scan be deducted against federal or state income taxes, respectively;
and q(5)arethe taxpayer's marginal federal and state income tax
rates, respectively; is percent of the local tax dollar which can
be credited towards federal and/or state taxes; and is the
portion of tax r paid directly by non—residents. The burden price
will differ across taxpayers in the same localityas 8,q, p and t
differ; 9(r) will be identical for ill taxpayers within a givencity.
The actual specification of (r) for each of the taxes in this
study will be a weighted average of individual ¶(5 scross taxpayers
from the city's 25th percentile income level (weight =.25),from the
city's 50th percentile income level (weight.50), and from the
city's 75th percentil, income level (weight —.25).Separate values
of 8 (defined as thepercentof households with the given income who
itemize their deductions),10 q (defined as the effectivemarginal
federal and state tax rate for the given income)111 andy (defined as
the rate of state tax credit for the given income)12are defined for
each local tax for each income class; p is always uniform forall
income classes in a given state (either 0 or 1). The deductibility
(1) (f) (r) (s)(s)(s) (t) expression (1—6 pq—8 pq y ) is calculated
first for each income class, and then theweighted average across the
three income classes is calculated for property taxation (denoted
FrPROP),forgeneral sales (BTGS), for selective sales (BTSS),andfor
income taxation (BTINC).The non—resident share of a local tax
(r)
(0) will also vary by tax andisdefined for property taxation as
thepercentof city property assessed as commercial—industrial (PCI).
for general sales taxation as the percent ofcity taxable general
sales purchased by non—residents (PNRGS), for selective salestaxation
as the percent of city taxable selective sales purchasedby non—
6residents (PNRSS), and for local income taxationas the percent of
city wages earned by non—residents (PNKY).13 Thecity's average
burden price for each tax, isthen the simple product of its
deductibility component and one minus the non—residentshare: TP =
BfflflOP(1—PCI) BTGS(1 —PNRGS), BTSS(1. —PNRSS).andINC
—BflNC(1—fliRt).I shall test for the effects of the Cr),on the
level and aix of local taxation and (giventhe reduced form focus of
this analysis) for thepossibledistinct effects of the deductibility
and non—resident share components of the
For completeness, we mustrecognize that in addition to taxes,
local fees sadlicensessayalsobe exported to non—residents. While
fees andlicenseare not deductible —n(s)—0) nor supported by
credits (y —0),they maybepaid by non—residents. I denote this
14 non—resident share of fees as PNRF. The residents' share of fees
(1—PNRF) will be included as element of thevector I
is
As a final conent on the specification of theburden price of
local finance, we must also note thatthe non—resident share of
revenues includes not only revenues paid today by thosein other
jursidictions but mayincludethe present value of revenues paid by
future residents whichgo to support today's services. How do future
taxpayers subsidize current services? Two mechanismsare available:
by underfunding public employee pensions andby rolling—over short—
term debt.15 Unless local land markets or labormarkets capitalize
these debts (and there is no good evidence thatthey do or do not),
future residents will bear a fraction of thecurrent costs for city
services. A precise estimate of the fraction of localrevenues paid
by future taxpayer's is not possible, but I do includein X. a likely
7determjnsnt of this share: the difference between thenational rate
of return on 6—month Treasury Bills and thecity's interest rate for
short—ten debt, discounted by the after—tax rite ofreturn from 6—
month T—Bills for the average income resident (AREINI1.ARnINr
measures the arbitrage advantage of holding city dollars in interest
bearing accounts and financing today's public servicesthrough
borrowing.As ARBINT rises, the non—debtsources of current period
revenues —taxesand fees —arelikely to decline if shifting to
future residents occurs.16
The political constraints on localrevenue choices are
specified by two variables which measure the relative sizeof
residential voting coalitions —thepercent of city households whose
income exceeds the national 75th percentile incomelenI(PCRICB) and
the percent of city households whose income isbelow the national 25th
percentile income level (PCPOOR) —onevariable designed to measure
the relative mobility of city tax base to thesuburbs —thelog of
the ratio of city to suburban income (LRCSI)17—atime trend (TEAR)
and a cityfiscalcrisis duyvariable(cRISIS —1,for yearsafter
18 the New York City crisis 1975 to 1980, 0 forprior years)to capture
any sytematic shifts in voter or bond market preferences forrevenue
levels or mix, and, finally, a vector ofcity duny variables to
control for each city's unique political environment andthe city's
status quo budget.
While these variables are a reasonable firststep to specifying
the structure of revenue choice, theysurely do not capture all
relevant economic and political forces. It is assumed thatwhat
factors have not been systematically specified will haveonly a
8stochastic influence across cities and time. Theerror structure of
the revenue model therefore allows forcross—equation correlation of
the error terms —politicalor economic shocks which influence
taxes,- or tax mix, are likely to influence feesas veil —andpermits
a lagged adjustment to these "shocks througha first—order
autoregressive process unique to each revenue instrument.Thus.
(.) .1.) (.) (5)e p( ) +e
C.)C.) where,BCe,e i ao but
E(eT), e) # 0, E(e', # 0, E(e),et)) # 0.
The model is estimated by generalized leastsquares allowing for
tax—specific autocorrelation and for thecross—equation correlation of
errors. When estimating this system of revenue equations, thetotal
tax identity Lt =Tallows us to either estimate all tax equations
and calculate T as the sum of each (r)or to estimate T and all but
one of the equations calculating the omitted individual tax as a
residual. The latter strategy is adopted here. Revenuesystems
involving total taxes, property taxes, general sales taxes,selective
sales taxes, income taxes, and fees and licensesare estimated. The
omitted tax category is a residual of miscellaneousspecialized city
taxes which is never more than five percent of city revenues,t9All
financial variables and city income are measured in real dollars
(deflated by P1) per capita.
9III. City Revenue Behaviour
A. Does Deductibility Matter?
Tables 1 and 2 sunarize thecentral results of estimating the
reduced fort revenue model, Table 1presents full staple Call cities
for all years) estimates of the effectson city revenues of the legal.
economic, and political constraints to local fiscalchoice. The
dependent variables for this full sampleanalysis are total taxes per
capita (1'), fees and licenses per capita (F).property taxes per
capita (t), and $newvariable combining revenue per capita from
each of the major taxes (income, generalsales, selective sales) other
than property (devoted as (1NM1J,. Thisaggregation of revenues
from the major, non—property taxeswas required because not all cities
are allowed to use each of the individual taxesover the whole sample
period, The tax burden price corresponding to tNl.)was defined
as the weighted average (where the weightsequal the share of in
(INC/SAL)
. Cr) t ,possiblyzero) of each of the individual v a. This
(INC/SAL) weighted average tax price is denoted as v in Table 1.
I also examine the separate effectsof the weighted average of
the taxes' deductibility components (denotedFrINCISAL) and non-
resident components (denoted (1—PNRINC/sa))The omitted revenue
equation is for 'other taxes' which accounts foronly 1.2% of total
ownrevenuefor the full sample.
Before examining the effects ofdeductibility on city fiscal
choice, it is instructive to suaarize briefly theinfluence of the
legal and political constraints as well as the effectsof the economic
variables income, aid, and relative prices. Theconstraints influence
city revenues largely as expected. Cities responsiblefor public
education (DED) have higher taxes,predominantly property taxes.
10Table 1
Local Revenue Behaviour








































































































































































PCRICR —1.25 —1.92' .98' —.49
(.81) (.65) (.49) (.76)
PcPOOR 1.16 —.60 2.63' —.17
(1.21) (.97) (.75) (.97)
tSCSI —11.19* —6.80' —2.46 —2.81S
(3.47) (2.64) (1.59) (3.42)
YEAR 2.54* 1.15' 1.85' 1.72'
(.59) (.47) (.34) (.50)
czisis .68 2.06 —.71 1.11
(2.22) (1.69) (1.03) (2.16)
City Duny n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
Variables
p .75' .78' .90' .64'
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.03)
.908 .874 .606 .821
Standard errors reported in parentheses. An 'indicatesthe estimated
coefficient is statistically significant from0at .1 level or better,
two—tailed t test.
n.r. —Notreported.Available from the suthor uponrequest.
n.a. =Notupplicable as variable is omitted from regression.
PROP INCISAL + Resultsreported for r and r are from separate
regressions, including all variables except BTPROP, (i—PCI).
BTINC/SAL or (1—PNRXNC/SAL).Cities with responsibility for welfare (DWL =1,for Baltimore, Boston
to 1970, Denver, Indianapolis since 1971. New York City, Norfolk, and
San Francisco) are the larger, older cities. Real taxisper capita
(and possibly services) are lower, with property taxes enjoying most
of the reduction. Tax relief is given to homeowners to compensate for
the added burden of paying for at least a part of welfare outlays.
Cities restricted to general sales taxes (DGS) and/or selective sales
taxes (DSS) raise less revenue than cities with access to an inocre
tax (DI). Tax access clearly has a revenue effect. Nominal mill rate
limits (RLIX) have no statistically significant effect on revenuesas
cities adjust assesaent rates or vote to override the limit. An
effective rate limit on property taxation (LEVYLIM) does reduce
revenues but thr effect is neither quantitatively nor statistically
significant in our sample cities.
Of the political constraint variables, a larger pool of rich
househelds (PatCH)seemsto reduce taxes overall and property taxes
in particular; the revenue nix is biased towards sales taxation and
wage income taxation as PatCH rises. A larger pool of very low
income families marginally increases total taxes, andparticularly
general sales and income taxes. The results suggest the possibility
of a majority rich—poor coalition which lowera propertytaxes,
increases services, and shifts the tax burden to the middle class (and
possibly fins) through the taxation of wages and retail sales. There
has been a steady annual (YEAR) upward trend in real city revenue from
all sources, a trend which hasnotbeen offset by the effects of the
New York City fiscal crisis or by the apparent increasedtaxpayer
awareness of city fiscal performance in the 1975 to 1980 period
11(CRISIS). The measure of middle classexit to the suburbs (LRCSI) has
the expected negative effect ontaxes, notably property taxation.
Economic competition appears to bea more effective check to the
growth of large city revenues than legislativeconstraints, at least
as they are now fashioned (RLIM, LEVYLIM)•
Relaxing the public sector's economic constraintthrough an
increase in residential incas. (CINC)or by reducing the costs of
goods and services in the region as a whole (PT)both increase the
city's ownrevenuesand public services. An increase in thecity's
grants—in—aid from categorical programs (CUD)or from general revenue
—sharing (ESAID) results in only marginal tax relief;almost all aid
is spent on public services in theselarge cities. The variable
AREINT measures the attractiveness ofdeferred financing andhas a
negativeeffect on property taxes andantotal taxes; the behavioral
reaponse measured by the elasticity of T withrespect to ARBINT is
only —.02, however. The residential share of feesand licenses (1—
PNRF) has no statistically orquantitatively important effect on
taxation;when significant in the fees equation theelasticity is
only .08.
Overall, the legal, economic, and politicalconstraints have
plausible effects on city revenue behavior. Thatare the specific
effects of deductibility? Tables 1 and 2 detailthe estimates of the
effects on city financing of changes in tax burdenprices, and
explicitly, the deductibility components (B1PROP, BTINC/SAL,B'l'SS,
BTVS, and BTINC) of those prices. Table 1 illustratesan important
result; the deductibility component and the non—residentcomponent of
tax burden prices often have opposite, andstatistically significant,
effects on city revenues. The differenceswere most noteable for
12property tax burden prices; dedactiblity (BTPROP) hasa positive
effect while the shire of taxes borneby residents (1—PCI)hasa
significant negative effect on local taxation:signs are reversed in
the fee equation. The twocomponents of do not behave as one,
as the initial specification suggested.2° Thisresult was true not
only for the full sample regressionsreported in Table 1, but for the
various subsample regressions as well. As Ishall argue below
(Section B) there are good reasons forthese differences, p•rticularly
in a reduced form model such as is estimated here.21Since our
central concern is predicting the effects ofthe deductibility
component on financing, I focus my discussion onthese coefficients.
Further, all policy simulations will use thesedirect estimates.
Table 2 sunarizes the influence ofdeductibility provisions on
local finance both for the full sample andfor the three subsamples of
cities. Subsample 1 consists of cities whoonly have •ccess to
property taxes, selective sales taxes, and fees;subsample 2 consists
of cities who only have access toproperty taxes, selective sales
taxes, general sales taxes and fees; andsubsample 3 consists of the
remaining cities who have access to property, selectivesales, income
taxes, perhaps general sales, and fees. Theelasticities of total
taxes (T), each available individual tax, (ti"),fees (F), and total
revenues (T +F)with respect to changes in deductibilityare reported
in Table 2. The results show that theremoval of deductibility
(Bl'PROP, BTSS, BTGS, and BTINC all rise towards 1)will increase taxes
(BTSS in subsszples 1 and 3 and BTINC insubsample 3 are the
exceptions), generally reduce fees, and, as oftenas not (BTSS and
BflNC are the significant exceptions), increasetotal city revenues.
13Table 2
Tax Deductibility and Local Finance:
Revenue Elasticities
- (PROP) t(1/L) (ss) td1N F CT +
FullSamyle
BTPROP •33* .26 .05 n.a n.e. n a —.23 .14
(1.89) (1.28) (.19) (.71)
BTINC/SAL .04 .01 .12 n.a n.e n.a. —.09 —.002 (.68) (.19) (1.33) (.82)
Sabsamyle 1
BTPROP .94 1.05* n.e. n.e. —1.09w n.e. .42 •79 (3.42) (3.45) (2.05) (.85)
BTSS —.49.51* n.e. n.e. —.04 n.e. —.46 —.48
(2.20) (2.05) (.09) (1.16)
Subsample 2
BTPKOP —.20 .14 n.a. —2.364.09 n.a. _3.63* —1.40
(.25) (.14) (1.44) (2.80) (2.79)
ETSS .36 .51 n.a. —.89 .23 n.e 1.22* .66
(1.11) (1.30) (1.37) (.39) (2.32)
BTGS .68 —.52 n.e. 3.79—45* n.e. .58 .65 (.82) (.51) (2.24) (—3.03) (.43)
Subsample 3
BTPItOP 1.16* 1.07* n.e. n.e. —1.07 2.15k .79 1.04
(3.02) (2.35) (.92) (3.31) (.76)
BTSS —.30 .27 n.e. n.e. —4.30 1.02 —.77 —.45 (.77)(.58) (3.66) (1.49) (.73)
BTINC —.96 _1.97* n.e n.e. 6.55* _4.14* —2.64 —1.49
(1.31) (2.26) (2.91) (3.22) (1.32)
An • indicates the calculated elasticity is basedupon a
coefficient estimate which is statistically significant at the .1
level or better. The absolute value of the t statistic for each
coefficient upon which the elasticity is based is given in
;arentheses below the reported elasticity.
Calculated as the weighted (by shares) average of theseparate
elasticites for TandF.
n.a. =notapplicable.On their face these resultsare, I suspect, counter—intuitive. But
two points need to be made. First, our intuition isabout the short—
run; the results reported here are equilibrium,long—run estimates of
the effects of deductibility onrevenues. There is a plausible long—
run explanation for these results; see section 111—B.Second, since
the deductibility components all havemean values of .85 or higher
(see Data Appendix), the selective removalof deductibility will imply
at most an 18% increase in the relevant taxprice variable (i.e.1 .85
to 1.0 is a change of 18% percent). The long—runeffects of reform on
total revenues CT +F)will be modest, therefore, ranging from a
possible increase in revenues of 18% (BTPROP inSubsample 3) to a
possible reduction of 25% (BflNC in Subsample 3). Formost reforms
now being discussed, the equilibrium revenue effects will bemuch
smaller; see section IV.
14B. Unraveling the Revenue Restonse: Short—Ran PoliticsMeets Long—
RunEconomics
Dissecting the long—run, equilibria response ofcity revenues to
deductibility reform requires *threestepargument. In step one, I
argue that deductibility reform will have a selective effect oncity
taxpayers which will create pressure for upper income householdsto
exit the center city for the suburbs. instep two. I outline the
city's likely short—run response to that pressure as areadjustment of
the local tax rates to favor theupper incom, classes. In step three,
the long—run effects of these rate adjustmentsare described through
the long—run tate—revenue schedule (the familiar "Laffercurve"). If
cities are on the downward aide of the long—runrevenue schedule, then
rate reductions to offset deductibility in the short—runray actually
increase city revenues.
The removal of deductibility of state and localtaxes will have
selective effects on taxpayers within our cities.Only those who
itemize will be directly affected. Evidence revealsthese families to
be the middle and upper income taxpayers, most oftenhomeowners. The
loss of deductibility will ask. local taxpayments more expensive for
these residents. The effect of this now moreexpensive local budget
may beto drive the marginal (just indifferent)upperincomeS families
from the central cities to the suburbs. Exit willoccur even though
deductibilityreform applies in the suburbs as well. The reason is
the relatively pro—poor bias of city, as compared to suburban,public
budgets; see Inman and Rubiafeld (1979).
A simple example makes the point. Upper income families whojive
within the city make a transfer to lower income families whichthey
15would not make were they to live inthe suburbs. Suppose the value of
this transfer ii*200per year paid as city taxes. For families in
the30percent tax bracket, (the typical itemizer),the net cost of
the pro—poor subsidy is *140 (—*200—deductionof 160). If the
family prefers the city to the suburbsit nst therefore derive .
benefit from city living (aboveany public services received) of at
least *140 —forexample, lover conuting costs, excitment ofcity
life, or perhaps the altruistic benefits
of helping (or living with)
the poor. The marginal (just
indifferent) upper income family derives
a net benefit of city living of
exactly *140/year. Nov remove the
deductibility of local taxes. The net cost ofthe within city pro—
poor transfer rises from *140/year to *200/year.Families who value
city living less than *200/year willnow (ignoring transaction costs)
exit to the suburbs.
The potential loss of its middleand upper income taxpayers isa
fiscal threat the city cannotignore. The city has two possible
responses: increase services to theupper income neighborhoods and/or
selectively lover those taxes which fallmost heavily on the rich and
middle class. The politicalreaction will no doubt be a combination
of the two, as cities attempt to
balance the competing interests of
the rich and poor.
The route to lower taxes, is ofcourse, to lower the rates. In
theshort—runwhen the tax base in the city isrelatively fixed, city
revenues will fall. In the longerrun, however, lower city tax rates
maystimulatewithin city investment byexisting households and firms
as well as possiblenew firm locations,increased work effort, and
added retail activity. The expansionof economic activity within the
16City in response to lower tax rates will increasethe city's taxable
base. In the long—run, the increase in basebegins to offset the
initial fall in revenues because of therate reduction. If the base
increase is large enough, revenuesmay actually increase. This long—
run relationship between tax rates (u) andrevenues (t) (popularly
called the "Laffer curve") is described inFigure 1. The long—run
schedule is the trace of points along variousshort—run (fixed, or
very inelastic base) schedules, where the tax—rate intersectsits
equilibrium short—run schedule for its given taxbase. As tax rites
rise (0< C ...
<g14),tax base falls, and conversely. For each tax
the more elastic is the tax base to ratechanges, the lower will be
the revenue maximizing rite .,22 Because ofthe long—run tax rite
revenue relationship, a decline (increase) in ritessay reduce
(increase) revenues —ifthe initial rate is 0 S.,sC i— or
increase (reduce) revenues —ifu C u<1. To understand the
effects of deductibility reform we must know,therefore, on which side
of the revenue—maximizing rate aSthecity's tax structure now
resides. I shall argue that it is likely citiesare to the right of
pjSforproperty and sales taxation and to the left of i'forincome
(wage) taxation. This third and last step permitsus to untangle the
observed long—run effects of deductibility reform.
The city's decision to set a local tax is, ofcourse, a political
decision, Yet no city politican, it wouldseem, should rationally set
rates beyond fl*; he would lose both votes and revenues!lby then
might u)p'for local taxes? The answer lies in the long—run
elasticity of the local tax base and the time horizon of politicans
relative to the time required to achieve a long—run taxbase
equilibrium. If the political time horizon is shorter than the
17ettue
t




0 u2= ux I_3economic adjustment process,tax rates to theright of u'areDot Only
feasible but likely. Buchanan and Lee (1981)were the first to make
this important point. Figure 2 illustrates twopossible equilibria.
The dashed lines in Figure 2represent the elected officials' chances
of re—election as a function of revenues (a"good' to be spent on
services) vs. tax rates ( a "bad"). As tax ratesrise, increasing
amountsofrevenues are needed to offset the political losses from the
rate increase; thus the political re—electioncurves bend upward.
Higher re—elect ion curves reflect preferred combinationsof revenue
and rates. the elected officials select thatrate which maximizes
their chances of re—election.The next election is generally only
twoyearsaway and never more than four. Voter myopia ("what haveyou
done for me lately") compresses apolitican's time horizon still
23 further. As a consequence elected officials select thatrate which
is rational, subject to the short—run (fixed—base)tax rate—revenue
schedule. The short—run revenue schedulesare the (nearly)
straightliues —denotedB(p) —inFigure 1. It is feasible for the
tax rate chosen subject to an always rising short—runrevenue
constraintto also be a long—runequilibrium on the downwardsloping
portion of the long—rn revenue curve; for example ) g in Figure
2a.
It is also likely. For those local taxes whosetax bases are
sensitive in the long—run to tax rate changes, thepeak of the long—
run schedule will occur at relatively low values ofuFurther,if
politicans' re—election curves are flat" —i.e.,voters value
targeted expenditures relative to general tax rate relief —wecan
well expect a tangency to the right of 0.Suchcities will be caught















IJ 1.1* 1in a "revenue trap" or "fiscal crisis" where increasing rates only
reduce tax base and revenues in the long—run. Available evidence
suggests that local property taxes and local general sales taxes are
24 likely to have elastic tax bases. Further, politicians in the
larger and older cities which comprise our sample are likely to face
"tight" expenditure needs and hence "flat" re—election canes between
revenue (i.e., expenditures) and tax rates. If so, tax rate—revenue
allocations such as those in Figure 2a result. For property and
general sales taxation, an equilibrium tax rate s > is both
feasible and plausible.
The available evidence on the elasticity of local income tax
bases to rate changes suggest a relatively inelastic base.25 Ifthis
is so, then the peak of the income tax revenue curve will result at
relatively high local rates. The equilibrium tangency of the
politicans' still "fiat" re—election curves to the short—run revenue
schedule may therefore occur to the left of x'; see Figure Zb. Thus
for local income taxes, it is feasible and likely that ji<u
No systematic argument regarding tax base elasticity for the set
selective sales taxes seems possible.This tax category includes
numerous miscellaneous taxes which vary greatly across sample cities.
Some of these taxes are likely to have elastic bases (tobacco, liquor,
entertainment, hotels) while the tax base of others will be rate
inelastic (public utilities). Cities' leg•l access to the individual
taxes may be restricted as well. For some cities (those who use
public utility taxes) u<sis likely, while for others (those who
taxconsumption and entertainment) i)Lismore plausible.
What are the implications of this political economic view (i.e.,
"structural model") for interpreting our reduced—form estimates of the
19effects of deductibility reform on city revenues? First, the proposed
model is long—run; since most of the variation in deductibility is
cross—section variation, the econometric results are long—run results
as well. Second. the model does help us to understand the possibly
counter—intuitive results of deductibility reform. For the full
sample results, a fall in property and/or income plus sales tax
deductibility stimulates total taxes, particularly from property
taxation. This result is explained by the political decision to lower
tax rates to keep the rich and upper middle class itemizers within the
city, a decision which, in the nd actually helps city revenues. It
should be noted that in the short—run city revenues decline and
services —mostlikely those allocated to the poor —arereduced.
Note too, that as rates fall, city politicans are moved to a
politically less preferred (lower chance of re—election) rate—revenue
allocation.
The three sets of subsample results can also be understood in
light of this model of short—run politics and long—run economics. -For
cities in subsample 1, the loss of property tax deductibility leads to
a rise in property tax revenues as predicted. But selective sales tax
revenues decline; the reason is most likely a combination of effects.
Subsample 1 cities have access to only property and selective sales
taxes. Lowering the property tax rate is a first priority. In the
short—run, however, revenues and public services will decline and to
offset, at least partially, this revenue loss selective sales tax
rates may be increased. In the long—run, if u>tforselective
sales taxes (an elastic tax base), revenue will decline. (A similar
story, but with tax roles reversed, can be told for an increase in
20BTSS.) For cities in subsample 2, we observea similar fiscal
reaction to the loss of deductiblity ofproperty taxation, As BTPROP
is increased, property tax rates are reducedand long—run revenues
increase. To offset the short—run revenue loss,general sales tax
rates may be increased, but as cities arelikely to be in the
declining range of this tax's long—run revenuecurve (g> is),general
sales tax revenues decline •s BTPROP rises. Thetax rates for the
selective sales taxes may rise or fall, but ifthey fall and p > z
for those taxes (see below) thenrevenue will rise with BTPROP
as is observed in subsample 2. The loss ofgeneral sales tax
deductibility (Bros rises) will lead to a short—run reductionin
(OS) general sales tax rates, but since p ) p° long—runrevenues from t
rise. Property tax rates and selective salestax rates may be
increased to soften the short—run revenue loss, butsince both taxes
are on the downward side of their long—run revenecurves (p ) p')
revenues will fall in the long—run. The loss of selectivesales tax
deductilibity (BTSS increases) for sample 2 cities will firstlower
(SS) - theserates. If so, and as long—run t rises, we must conclude
that sample 2 cities are on the fallingsegment of their long—run
revenue carve, that is, u > ,.Thereduction in short—run revenues
is offset by rate increase for general salestaxes, which (as p > p5)
leads to a long—run decline in Property revenues rise slightly
in the long—run, implying thatproperty rates were initially reduced
as BitS rose. Finally, for cities in subsample 3, the loss of
property tax deductibility again reveals the familiar pattern. As
flROP rises, property rates are reduced andproperty tax revenues
rise in the long—run. To offset the short—run loss ofrevenues, tax
rate, on local income taxes are likely to be increased. Asa
21consequence, long—run revenues rise for income taxes (as p < p).
With the increase in BTPROPJ the rates for selective silos taxesmay
rise of fall, but if they fall (as they did in subsample 2) and ifji
tS forthese taxes (see below) then revenues will decline as
observed.The loss of income tax deductibility (BTINC increases)
leads to a lowering of income tax rates and a short—run andlong—run
loss of income tax revenues (again as z < p). To offset the short—
run revenue loss, property tax rates and selective sales ratesmay be
increased; these adjustments will lead to the estimated long—run
decline in property tax revenues (asp> is') and long—rn increase in
selective sales revenue (if p ( s'). The loss of selective sales tax
deductibility (BTSS up) is likely to lead to a lowering of these
rates. If so. and as declines, we must conclude that sample 3
cities are on the rising segment of their selective sales revenue
curve that is, p C u'Finally, the fall in is offset by our
incresse in income tax revenues as income tax rates are raised.
The reactions of user fees and license revenues to changes in
deductibility also show a logical pattern.The bulk of fees and
license revenues are charges to business for city services (transport.
sewerage, sanitation, airports). While mymeasures of deductibility
focusou households as taxpayers, the variation in household tax
prices from deductibility provisions, tax credits, and statetax rates
arelikely to be positively correlated with a deductibility benefit
for firms aswell.If so, anobservedloss of deductibility threatens
firm exit from the city too. A logical strategy for cities is to
lower firm taxes. Fees and license revenues is one of themajor
taxes cities now impose on business. Thus an increase in BIflOP,
22BTINC, BTGS, and BTSS should have negative effectson fees (F).
Generally they do. The only important exception is thepositive
effect of an increase in BTSS on F forsubsample 2; the positive
adjustments in F are very nail however, for BTSS variesat most by 4%
(thus F varies by about 5% =1.22x 4%). Vhere swings in tax prices
are important, the elasticity of foes is negative.
With most reduced—form analyses one canonly speculate as to the
underlying structure which produces the observed behaviour. This
study is no exception. Yet such speculations are a useful test"of
the validity of the empirical analysis. Dopossibly counter—intuitive
empirical results have a plausible and consistent structural
explanation? If so, our confidence in those estimates increases. I
have argued that the empirical results of Tables 1 and 2can be
supported by such a structural explanation. To be sure, more research
is needed to reveal the true structure of local fiscalchoice, but the
model presented here of short—run politics andlong—rneconomics must
be regarded as a plausible contender.26
IV. Deductibility Reform and City Revenues
Table 3 summarizes the predicted effects of alternative
deductibility reform proposals on city revenues, first for our full
sample and then for each of the three subsamples. (A data appendix
lists the cities in each subsample.) For each reform, Iestimate the
implied dollar change from the average 1980 values of real (deflated)
taxes per capita CT) and real fees per capita (F) for eachsample.
The initial 1980 levels of taxes and fees are listed in Table3. I
also calculate the percentage change in taxes or fees from their1980
values.
23Deduc:ii1it-: Reforms*
Policy1: Full removal of federal deductibility of local
property taxation only.
Policy 2: Full removal of federal deductibility of local
generalsales taxation only.
Policy 3: Full removal of federal deductibility of local
incometaxation only.
Policy 4: Full removal of federal deductibility of all local
taxation
Policy 3: Taxpayers are allowed to deduct local taxes above
1% of household adjusted gross income (Aol).
Policy 6: Taxpayers are allowed to deduct local taxes up to
a ceiling of 6.5 of adjusted gross income. Local
taxes above this ceiling are not deductible.
Policy 7: Local tax deductibility is replaced by a percentage
tax credit. The level of the credit is set so that
the cost of credit in federal tax revenues equals
$19 billion annually.
Policy 8: Removal of local tax deductibility with cities given
a revenue sharing grant equal to local governments
share of $19 billion annually.Table 3
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—34.4%Policy options 1 to 4 removedeductibility for local property
taxation only (1), general salestaxation only (2), income taxation
only(3). and finally for all localtaxes Simultaneously (4). To
estimate effects of reform onrevenues, the revenue elasticities in
Table 2 corresponding to eachtax price and sampleweremultiplied by
the percentage increase in eachdeductibility component. I assume the
deductibility component of tax price willrise to 1.0 when federal
deductibility is removed. This is anoverestimate of the change in
tax price since state deductibility oflocal taxes and state tax
credits for property taxationmay not disappear. The estimates in
Table 2 are therefore maximal estimatesof revenue adjustment. The
total effect on city revenues will bethe sum of the dollar changes in
taxes and fees.
Policy options 5 to 8 all seek to reducethe possible negative
effects on state and localrevenues of reform while retaining the
potential efficiency and tax equityadvantages of removing
deductibility. To reduce the potentialrevenue loss to state and
local governments, particnlarly inthe short—run, we can either allow
partial deductibility (options S and 6)or offer offsetting subsidies
to taxpayers (option 7) or to localgovernments (option 8) directly.
Each of these modified proposals,however, will reduce the netsavings
to the Treasury from reform.Treasury and ACIR (1985 chapter 3)
estimate that option 4, full removal ofdeductibility, will save *34
billion of federal tax revenuesannually. Policy optiona 5—8 allocate
some of theee savings to ease the burden ofreform. To Insure
comparability, the policy parameters of proposals 5to 8 are set so
that each costs approximately *19billion in lost federal revenues;
see ACIR (1985. chapter 3).
24Option.5only allowsdeductibil ity of local taxes which exceed a
floor of 1% of taxpayers' adjusted gross income. I have assumed the
typical itemizer is in the 28% marginal tax bracket and has an
adjusted gross income of *40.000. Thus under option 5 the taxpayer
can deduct all state and local taxes over *400. Since most taxpayers
pay in excess of *400/year in state—loc.l taxes, the taxpayers can
still itemize marginal local tax payments. The price effect of
deductibility remains. However, itemizers loses .28 x *400 in lost
deductions or approximately *120/year. This income loss can reduce
local taxes and fees (see Table 1; CIINC coefficient). If we assume
the resulting loss in income per capita is about *30 peryear
(*120/year +4members per family), then revenues will decline as
27 shown in Table 3, row 5.
Policy Option 6 is a variation of policy 5; taxpayers are still
allowed to deduct but now only to a ceiling of 6.S% of adjusted gross
income. Beyond this ceiling local taxes are not deductible. For the
typical itemizes in the 28% marginal tax bracket and earning Mo,ooo,
state and local taxes up to *2600 per family will be deductible (=
.065x *40,000). Only taxpayers in very high tax states and cities
will be affected by the 6.5% ceiling. Those affected will lose
deductibility for taxes above *2600. but they retain a fixed gainof
*728 (—.28 x $2600) from the deduction up to the ceiling. The effects
of this reform on city revenues is difficult to predict precisely.
Cities whoes itemizers pay less than their ceiling in state and local
taxes are unaffected by the reform. Cities whose typical itemizers
pay more than their ceilings may adjust revenues. This adjustment is
estimated as a combination of the revenue effects of optLon 4 offset
25by the revenue increases which remit from increased resident income
(from income with option 4) because of the fixed gain from the partial
deduction (n*728/familyor *182 per capita). See Table 3. row 6.
Policy option 7 partially offsets the loss of deductibility by a
tax credit for local taxation defined as y in our •arlier definition
of the tax price. The size of the credit is set so as to cost the
Treasury approximately $19 billion: y —.07under this reform.
28
Co.bining lost deductibility with a 7% credit will increase the
deductibility components of sales income, and property tsr prices
from their initial values (.86) to.93. The resulting revenue
adjustments are reported in Table 3, row 7.
Option 8 gives the city the direct revenue assistance to offset
any negative effects of deductibility reform.In this reform •ll
state—local tare. lose federal deductibility but state and local
governments receive *19 billion in revenue—sharing aid as
compensation. I estimate that approximately $33 per resident will be
returned to local governments.29Not all of the *33 transfer goes to
city services, however; some (a small amount) may be allocated to tax
relief (see Table 1; RSAID coefficient). Table 3, row 8 estimates the
equilibrium changes in tax and fees under option 8. to estimate the
total revenue effects of this reform, the *33 transfer must be added
to the estimated changes in fees and taxes.
Other reforms are of course possible and have been suggested.
Table 3's results bound the likely effects of the other major reform
proposals. The lemp-lasten proposal which would retain deductibility
for property taxation (at 25% rate only however) but disallow
deductibility of sales and income taxes will have effects
approximately equal to the sum of those for policies 2 (sales) and 3
26(income) in Table 3. The Bradley—Gephardt tax reform plan drops sales
tax deductibility (option 2) and lowers the rate (to 14%) at which
property and income taxes can be deducted. The effects of this reform
are bounded between thosefron option 2 (only sales) and option 4
(full removal).
That is the effect of deductibility reform on city revenues?
Four conclusions emerge frog the policy simulations in Table 3.
First, total taxes change very little in the long—run, falling by at
most 13% (reform 3, subsample 3) and generally rising slightly.
Second, fees and license revenue (predominantly a tax on fins)
generally fall, often significantly (policies 4,6, and 8 for
30 subsamples 2 and3). Third, the net long—run effect on total
revenues (AT +F) of full deductibility reform (options 4 to 8) is
usually positive, but when negative, the revenue loss is at most 12%
of pre—refora revenues (——*24.68/1201for option 4, subsample 2).
Fourth, the offset policies 5to8 reduce the revenue effects
significantly. In fact, the revunue—sharing offset (policy 8)
substantially increases city revenues once we add *33 per capita of
revenue—sharing aid to the city budget.
While the results in Table 3 should be encouraging to the
proponents of state and local deductibility reform, we must remember
that these estimates apply only to large cities and they measure only
the long—run effects of dropping deductibility. States and suburban
goveraents say behave quite differently; see lenyon (1985) and
Graslich (1935). Andthereis no doubt that in the short—run cities
will feel the pressure to lower taxes and public services.
27V. Conclusion: Should We Drop Deductibility?
Removing the deductibility of state and local taxes has emerged
as the cornerstone of the recent efforts to reform the current federal
tax code. While numerous other deductions or 'loopholes ire closed
by the Treasury's tax package, it is state and local deductibility
reform which provides the revenues needed to lower overall rates and
to raise the level of personal exemptions. While fewer loopholesor a
simplier tax code is always a worthwhile objective, one suspects it is
tat relief which makes the Treasury's proposal so politically
appealing. Yet it is important to consider the removal of state and
local tax deductibility as a policy in its own right, not simplyas a
source of new federal revenues. The enpirial analysis presented here
may help us to decide the issue.
First, the major efficiency gains from deductibility reform, at
least for our central cities, will come not fromlowerlocal public
spending but from a more efficient structure of local taxation.
Deductibility reform is likely to lower tax rates on property1 retail
sales, and wage income in the center cities. Each of these taxes is a
source of significant resource misallocation, discouraging the
efficient location of housing and productive capital.31 Further, as
ourcentralcities appear to be on the downward aide of their rate—
revenue schedules for property and sales taxation, lower rates may
actually mean more revenues and thus public services. Deductibility
reform "shocks" the central city away from a politically expedient.
28but economically inefficient. structure of localfinance.
Second, there are gains in public sector equity, buta full
federal—state—local budgetary incidence will be required toweigh the
pluses and minuses across income classes. The removal of
deductibility itself and the return of those revenues as lower tax
rates and higher personal exemptions clesrly helps lower income
families.Only rich families areitemizers, while all households gain
from the reduction in federal rates. Thelikely incidence effects
withinthe local public sectorare more difficult to judge. Local
taxesnay become more regressive to the extent cities canlegallytilt
their rste structures, and city services (as argued in 111—Babove)
are likely to become more pro—rich. Yet city servicesmay also
increase for all households inthelong—run as city revenues rise. It
is not clear the center city poor will lose services in thelong—run.
Public services in the suburbs are likely to fall, however. If
suburban governments have avoided the politically inefficientrevenue
trap0 and are still on the rising portion of the tax rate—revenue
schedule, thentheloss of deductibility will lesd to lower service
demands by as much as ten percent (Gramlich. 1985). Thus
deductibilityreform naynarrowpublic service inequities between city
and suburban residents. On balance lower income, non—itemizersgain
federal tax relief andpossiblylose local public services. Upper
income itemizers within the city pay higher federal taxes butgain
local public services. Upper income ite.izers within the suburbs will
pay higher federal taxes and lose local public services. Whether
these re—allocations constitute a net gain in social equityclearly
depends onone'ssense of fairness and relative weighting of public
29vs. private goods.
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1Dther possiblesources of funding current public services are the
expansion of short—ten debt or the depletion of cash andsecurity
holdings. Efforts to include these sources and estimate a current
accounts deficit equation nrc not successful. The problemappears to
be too little variation in the dependent variableover the sample
period for the majority of the sample cities.
2Preyious workon the effects of federal tax laws on local and state
finance has been limited to one year cross—sectionanalyses; see Inman
(1979). Hettich and Winer (1984), and lenyon (1985). Suchcross—
section studies cannot adequately control for unmeasured political,
economic, or institutional differences across observations.
differences which may be highly correlated with the extent of
31deductibility or taxpayer itemization (often used as a proxy for
deductibility). Therefore the estimated infloence of deductibility
may be badly biased in such studies. Estimation using pooled cross—
section, times—series data is the only solution to these proble.s.
3See Mueller (1979chapter 3).
4
But see last (1982).
5All fiscal data for thisstudy are from the annual U.S. Census
publication, City Government Finances, for the fiscal years 1960 to
1979—80. The revenue categories analyzed here correspond to the
Census' definition of total taxes CT), tax revenue from property
(1) (2) taxation Ct ), general sales taxation Ct), selective sales
taxation (t3), income taxation (t4), all "other" taxes (t5), and
fees and licenses (F •motorvehicle licenses" plus "miscellaneous
licenses" plus "charges and miscellaneous general revenue" sinus
"charges for higher education"). Total revenue (K) corresponds to the
category "general revenue from own aources" titus "charges for higher
education." Utility revenue or employee—retirement revenues are
excluded from analysis.
61n addition totesting for a fixed (or intercept) effect of tax
availability on revenue decisions. I also divide th, forty—one city
sszple into three, mutually exclusive subsamples according to tax
instrument availablity; see Data Appendix for details. This more
general treatment allows both the intercept (a.) and slope
32coefficients ($.'s) to differ according to a city's access to
different taxes.
7lost states will impose ratelimitations on local sales taxation and
local income taxation as well, but information on the exact limits
were not available for all years of our sample. That data were
available showed little variation (rates usually between 1% and 2%)
across the cities in our staple. Thus the tax—access dummy variables
DI and DOS will, in effect, be rate limit dummy variables where DI —0
and DOS0 mean a rate limit equal to 0.
It is important to emphasize that even when cities face effective
rate limits, tax revenues from the constrained tax are still
endogenous as city's often retain control over tax base and always
retain control over enforcement and collection, Tax rates are only
one, though probably the most important, of the control variables to
limit local revenues.
Data for RLIM and LEVYLIM are obtained from the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Feature, of
Fiscal Federalism, various years, and from Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, State Limitation on Local Taxes and
ExDenditures, February ,1977.
8CINC is defined as disposable incomeper resident (from Sties
Management, Effective Buying, 1960 —1980)adjusted for the resident's
share of local taxes. CUD is defined as city aid from federal and
state governments other then welfare aid or general revenue—sharing;
data from Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 1960 through
1979—80. RSAID ia general revenue—sharing aid as reported in Bureau
33of the Census, City Government Finances, 1960 to 1979—80. P1 is a
city cost of living index based upon the metropolitan annual costs of
goods and services for a family of four, net of housing expenses; dats
are from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Handbook of Labor Statistics, various years from 1967 to 1980. P1 for
years prior to 1967 use the city's 1967 metropolitan index deflated by
the national CPI for the years 1960 to 1966.
9This variable wasfirstpresented in lain (1972, 1979); see also
Zinerma(1983).Denny and Mackay (forthcoming) provide a general
treatment of this variable.
10lteaization by incomeclassisavailableannually for a national
staple of taxpayers from Statistics of Income. Individual Income Tax
Return, published by the IRS.
12Data on the marginal taxrate for federal income taxes are from
Table no. 437, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1983, the
source of which is unpublished data from the U.S. Treasury. Data on
the marginal tax rates for state income taxes are available from the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Sisnificant
Features of Fiscal Federalism, various years, and from state tax codes
for years not available from Significant Features.
t2Datanecessary to define the relevant rate of property tax credit
are available from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, Property Tax Circuit—Breakers: Current Status and Policy
34Issues, February. 1975. and from the ACIR publication, Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism, variousyears. The credit rite (y) for
eligible taxpayers ii defined as j'a (averagebenefit paid per
claimant/average property tax paid per claimint) for each state. As
mOat programs are limited by income, only thosetaxpayers in each city
who are income eligible are allowed a value ofy > 0. If in age
restriction also applies (often only taxpayers over 62are eligible),
y was multiplied by the percent of households in the city over the age
limit. A similar adjustment was made if theprogram was limited to
homeowners; y was multiplied by the percent of households who are
homeowners. Unfortunately data on age and hone ownershipby income
class ire not available by city; thus a more precise estimate of the
average rate of credit could not be calculated.
'3Data on thepercent of city property assessed as commerical—
industrial property (PCI) are available from the publication ProDerty
Taxation, Census of Government, for the years 1957, 1962, 1967. 1972,
1977, and 1982. Simple linear trends were calculated for the
intervening sample years.
The percent of general sales taxation paid by non—residents
(PNRGS) was estimated as the ratio —(totalretail sales in the city —
residentpurchases)/(total retail sales in the city), where resident
purchases was approximated by the share of residents' disposable
income apent on taxable items. Taxable items under general sales
taxation generally include all expenditures except services,
transportation, health care, and housing; the taxable sharp was
estimated to be .6 of disposable income (see Honthakker and Taylor
(1970) or Rock (Table 1. 1984). Data for retail sales in the city and
35for disposable income are available frog Sale Management, Survey of
Buying Power, for the years 1960—1980.
The percent of selective sales taxation paid by non—residents
(PNRSS) is in principle estimated by the ratio —(totalselective
sales in the city —residentpurchases of selective sales)/(total
selective sales in the city), where 'selective saless is defined to
include public utility sales in cities which tax public utility sales
and entertainment, hotel, and recreation activities in cities which
tax these activities. Data on entertainment, hotel and recreation
expenditures in cities are available from Sales Management. Survey of
Buying Power; 1960—1980. The residents' expenditures on
entertainment, hotel and recreation within the city wasestimatedas
.03of residents' disposable income; this share is one—kilt of the
total share of disposable income generally allocated to such
activities; see Houthakker andTaylor(1970). Data on public utility
sales are not available by city. I therefore assumed all of public
utility taxes —thebulk of which are paid by firms —fallon non—
residents. With this adjustment PNRSS is now approximated by the
ratio —(publicutility taxes +G(totalselective sales taxes —public
utility taxes)/(selective sales taxes), where 0 equals the non—
residents share of entertainment, hotel, and recreation expenditures
within the city.
The percent of city wages earned by non—residents (flIRT) is
approximated by the ratio (suburban income per family x number of
coutors)/(total wage income earned within the city). hlcs
Management,Survey of Buying Power, 1960—1980, provide. estimates of
suburban income per family. The Bureau of the Census publication
36Journ!v to Work, 1960, 1970, 1980 provids data to estimate the
fraction of the city work force who commute; data forintervening
years are calculated by a linear trend. Total wage income earned in
the city is the sum of suburban commuter income pluscity resident
income earned in the city, City resident income is estimatedascity
income per capita times the number of city jobs heldby city residents
(i.e., total city jobs less jobs held by commuters). Dataon city
resLdent income are frog Sales Manazegent. Survey of Buyina Power.
1960—1980. Data on total jobs within the city are from U.S. Census,
JourneytoWork, 1960. 1970, 1980 and equals the total number of
people who work within the city; intervening years are calculated bya
linear trend. Adjustments to PNRY are aide for cities which tax
Commuters and residents at different rates,
14Thepercentof fees and licenses (exclusive of fees for higher
•ducation) paid by non—residents (PNRP) is approximated by the share
offeesand licenses from parking fees, highway tolls, airport fees,
water transport fees, and fees from miscellaneous commercial
activities.
15For a tore complete discussionsee main (1982,1983).
16Gordon and Slemrod (1985)explore this formoftax shifting in sore
detail.
17The variable, ratio ofcity to suburban income (KCSI), has been used
with some success in other work Unman, 1982) to measure the potential
mobility of city residents to suburbs. Cities whose mean household
37income is low relative to mean suburban income have poor residents
surrounded by relatively rich suburbs (small valu,s of RCSI) while
cities whose sean income is high relative to mean suburban inocme have
relatively rich residents surrounded by poor suburbs (high values of
RCSI). In both instances, acceptable suburban housing will be
unavailable to city residents who wish to leave. Exit will therefore
be limited. Regions where mean city and suburban incomes are
approximately equal will have acre extensive suburban housing options
for city residents, and the threat of exitwill be more intensely felt
by city officials. The ideal specification is therefore RCSI and
RCSI2. This specificationwastried,and in all cases a minimum or
aaxnaumwasachieved well beyond the limits of our sample. To
conserve degrees of freedom the log specification was therefore
adopted.
18For a discussion of the New York fiscalcrisis and similar crises in
Cleveland and Philadelphia. see Inman (1983). Prompted by these
events, the period 1975 to 1980 wasa timeof increased public
scrutiny of central city budgets and taxstructures.
omittedtax category is defined asothertaxes by the U.S.
Bureau of the Census public.tion, City Government Finances.
20The difference. aregenerally statistically significant. The
initially hypothesized specification is that T —a+ + + e,
where r =(l—BTPROP)(l—PCI).If included separately the estimated
A
coefficient of (1—BTPROP), denoted should equal P(1—PCI)while
38the estimated coefficient of (1—PCI), denoted should equal
B'IPROP), One test of the hypothesis that the twovariables ire
correctly specified via r alone is a test that 91/(l—PcI)o
or alternatively the 6a 1/(1—PCI))—
2/(l—B'lPRÔP)
a
0.A t test of the null hypothesis that—0in the total tax
equation against th. alternative hypothesis that 0 #0reJects the
null hypothesis at a .99 confidence interval; t —3/a0r 132.6/39.33=
3.37.A similar teat for the coefficientson BTINC/SAL and (1—
PtIRINC/SAL) from Table 1 does not reject theequality of those
coefficients however; t aG/a
—.43.Yet over all subsample revenue
GS regression. we can generally reject equality of thecomponents of r
SS INC and v .LaI shall argue below there are compellingreasons
for different effects of these variables oncity revenues; see section
Ill—B.
21Thearguments for the separate effects of deductibility and non-
resident taxation on city revenues raises thepossiblity that PCI,
PNEGS. PNRSS, and PNRI are not exogenous but in factdeternined in
part by revenues. To test for the possibility of serious simultaneous
equation bias in our estimates of the effects of deductibilityon
revenues, I re—estimated all models excluding PCI, PNRGS, PNRSS, PNRT,
and (for similar reasona) ASBINT. The coefficientson the
deductibility variables were essentially unchanged.
22'rax revenues are maximized at the rate where ati8u a +
a owhere (r)pB(p) and (w) is the elasticity of tax
base, B(jt). with respect to the tax rate u• As the tax base becomes
more responsive to changes in tax rate, the elasticity becomesmore
39negative and the value of atia declines. For constant
elasticities at least, this implies that will reach 0 at
lower values of M as tax bases become sore elastic.
23See Fair (1978). Given thehigh mobility of voters into and out of
local comeunities, the what—have—you—done—for_ne_latelys mentality
may be rational for local voters as well. See Inman (1982) on pension
funding.
24See Grieson (1974)on property taxation and Grieson fl j. (1977)
for sales taxation.
25Labor supply elasticitiesare generally lot, but sOre iaportantly
the elasticity of job location with respect to tax rates is also
modest. Gruenstein (1980) estimates that while Philadelphia does lose
jobs with tax increases, total wage tax revenues are still increasing.
26The implicitstructure of the model presented here will define local
tax rates U(r)) and revenues (t(t)) as the outcome of an economic
(r) (r) process which defines a long—run revenue schedule —t —f(ja ;T).
where 7 are exogenous economic variables —anda short—run political
reaction function which selects (11(t),(r))combinations subject to a
set of political variables (Z) and current period tax bases which are
themselves a function of 7 and past revenue policies — —
Z.7;g), tr). Equilibrium allocations occur when
the political resction function intersects the long—run revenue curve;
see Figure 2. The reduced form of this model becomes:
40(r) (r) t t(T,Z;,71,2)
Which is the specification outlined inequations (1) —(5) above.
Economic constraints define the 7 variables whilepolitical
constraints and legal constraints are included in Z.Deductibility
reform influences directly through 7 and indirectly through the
political reaction function via 7_i.
27Tbe subsample resultsare based upon estimated effects of CINC on T
and F from subsample revenue regressions not reported here, The
effects are similar to those given in Table 1 for the fullsample.
Subsample regressions are available from the authorupon request.
28The credit is definedso as to return $19 billion to the state and
local sector as a subsidy to state and local taxation. I estimate
state and local taxes to be about $260 billion in 1985; thusy =
*19b1*260b .07.
29The generalrevenue sharing program will spend $19 billion per year
or $85 per capita. Approximately 39 percent of total state and local
taxes are raised by local governments. If federal aid is divided
between the state and local sectors according to resident taxespaid.
then 39 percent of total aid or *33 per capita (—.39x *85) will be
given to local governments.
301t should be noted that theTreasury's most recent proposal
continues to permit firms to deduct state and local taxes as a
41business expense. If the argument in section III is correct that fees
ire reduced to soften the blow to firms of lost deductibility, then
the induced reduction in fees under the Treasury pin should be less
than the losses reported in Table 3. There may still be pressure to
lower fees under the Treasury proposal to the extent that lost
deductibility for households is shifted to firms. For example, fins
ny bear the burden of differential local wage and sales taxation. In
any case, the fee reductions in Ttbl• 3 are likely to be an on outer
estimate of the revenue loss with deductibility reform.
31See, for example, Grieson (1974) sadKaurin (1981).
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44Data Appendix
Means (standard deviations)
Variable Full Subsample Subsample Subsample
Name Sample 1 2 3
Dependent
T 1104.14 *100.99 *110.28 1130.14
(65.72) (71.12) (72.78) (75.45)
*69.61 *91.25 162.97 *60.07
(56.51) (70.31) (49.37) (50.78)
*32.21 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(30.98)
(GS)
t n.a n.a. *25.29 na
(14.94)
(SS) n.a. *8.49 *12.49 *10.35
(8.04)(10.96) (11.87)
(INC) a t n.•. n.a. n.a. .9.01
(24.62)
F *50.98 *42.36 *58.27 *61.43
(27.84)(21.58) (29.03) (28.71)
Legal
DED .202 .387 .133 .138
(.402) (.488) (.340) (.346)
ML .145 .102' .224 .138
(.352) (.304) (.417) (.346)
DI .242 n.a. n.a. na.
(.421)
DSS .314 n.a. n.m.
(.465)
DOS .361 na. n.a. n.a.
(.481)
RLIJI .061 .051 .067 .068
(.052) (.059) (.049) (.053)
LEVYLIJ& .199 .216 .255 .094











CINC 13101 *2891 *3355 bus
(577) (542) (586) (451)
CAID 161.12 *62.86 *57.06 *83.93
(65.27) (69.52) (54.84) (82.87)
RSAXD 14.50 *3.15 ls.si *7.45
(6.44) (5.57) (6.51) (7.89)
Pt 1.289 1.188 1.397 1.402
(.430) (.401) (4.37) (.440)
PROP)
554 .523 .578 .536
(.089) (.096) (.091) (.067)
zrPnop .868 .866 .867 .875
(.043) (.051) (.029) (.046)
(1—PCI) .638 .605 .666 .613
(.098) (.107) (.101) (.071)
INC / SAL
.560 u.s. u.s. na.
(.422)
BTINC/SAL .865 u.s. u.s. u.s
(.213)
(1—PNRINC/SAL) .628 u.s. u.s u.s.
(4.81)
u.s. .314 .156 .676
(.367) (2.05) (.444)
zrss u.s. .946 .975 .979
(.057) (.045) (.037)
(1—PNRSS) u.s. .327 .161 .689
(.379) (2.05) (.451)
GS







BTGS u.s. u.s. .871 u.s.
(.028)
(1—naGs) u.s. u.s. .795 u.s.
(.642)
INC
t u.s. u.s. u.s. .555
(.175)
BTINC u.s. u.s. u.s. .887
(.033)
(1—PNRY) u.s. u.s. ma. .628
(.202)
(1—flaP) .822 .857 .759 .865
(.164) (.094) (.218) (.095)
.028 .024 .032 .031
(.016) (.014) (.016) (.019)
Politics I
23.16 22.48 24.89 19.77
(4.95) (4.42) (5.65) (2.76)
cpoog 11.94 11.99 11.97 13.27
(3.99) (4.77) (3.79) (2.60)
LZCSI .017 .002 .223 .033
(.381) (.343) (.368) (.398)
TEAl 1970 1968 1971 1972
(6.06) (6.06) (5.68) (5.57)
ISIS .286 .205 .374 .386
(.452) (.401) (.485) (.488)
u.s.aNotapplicableto staple.Composjuon of Subsamples
Subsample 1: Use of property and selectivesales taxes only.
Atlanta,' Baltimore. Birmingham, Boston,'Buffalo,'
Cleveland, Dali is, Pt. Worth, Houston.
Indianapolis,' Kansas City, Memphis,'Milwaukee,'
Minneapolis,'Newark,' Norfolk. Oklahoma City,
Omaha,Portland,sRochester, San Antonio, Seattle,
St.Paul.
Subsample 2: Use of property, general salestax, or selective
sales taxes only.
Birmingham, Buffalo, Cbicago,* Dallas,'Denver,'
Pt. Worth,' Houston,• Kansas City,Long Los
Angeles,sNew Orleans,s New York,Norfolk,S
Oakland,sOklahomaCity,.Omaha,'Phoenix,'
Rochester,'SanDiego,'San San Antonio,'Seattle,' St. Louis.
Subsample 3: Use of property, selectivesales, •nd income taxes.
Some cities in this staplemay also have access to
ageneral sales tax.
Baltimore,'Birmingh,,m,s Cincinnati,' Cleveland,'
Columbus,'Detroit,' Kansas City,' Louisville,•
New York.'Philadelphia,s Pittsburgh,' St. Louis,'
Toledo.' +Citiesmay appear in more than one subsample if new taxesare made available over time, An • locatesthe tai subsample to which
the city belonged in 1980.